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Recent Developments

Pappaconstantinou v. State:
The Common-Law Requirement that a Confession Be Voluntary Does Not Apply
When a Private Individual Elicits a Confession
By Jennifer Golub

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the
common-law requirement of
voluntariness does not apply to
confessions elicited by private
individuals. Pappaconstantinou v.
State, 352 Md. 167, 721 A.2d 241
(1998). In so holding, the court found
that questions of admissibility
regarding confessions elicited by
private individuals should be decided
by the rules of evidence, more
specifically, by the rules ofrelevance.
This case is important to Maryland
law because it sets forth a bright-line
test allowing statements made to
private individuals to be admissible if
they are relevant.
Pappaconstantinou ("Pappas")
was employed at Auto Row Auto
Parts ("Auto Row") in Waldorf,
Maryland. Id. at 170, 721 A.2d at
242. He was fired following suspicion
that he was stealing from the company.
Id.at170, 721 A.2dat242-43. After
his termination, Pappas met with Auto
Row employees, at which time he
signed a statement admitting that he
had stolen from the company and had
been justly terminated. Id. at 170, 721
A.2d at 243.
Criminal charges were
subsequently brought against Pappas
for theft in the Circuit Court of
Maryland for Charles County. /d.
Pappas filed a pre-trial motion to
suppress his statement, which the trial
court did not address at the pre-trial
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stage. Id. At trial, Pappas renewed
his motion to suppress. Id. The trial
court determined that Pappas's
confession was admissible because it
was voluntary and competent
evidence. Id. at 170-71, 721 A.2d
at243. AjuryfoundPappasguiltyof
twelve counts oftheft under $300 and
one count over $300. Id. at 170, 721
A.2d at 243. Pappas appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed. Id. at 171,
721 A.2d at 243. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari and affirmed the court of
special appeals. Id.
The issue before the court was
whether Pappas' confession to his
employer should have been excluded
from evidence at trial for lack of
voluntariness. Id. at 170, 721 A.2d
at 242. Pappas contended that he
confessed because his former
employer promised not to prosecute
ifhe admitted to the thefts. Id. at 171,
721 A.2d at 243. He acknowledged
that no governmental actors were
involved in eliciting his confession. Id.
Arguing that no distinction exists
between statements made to
government agents and statements
made to private individuals, Pappas
urged the court to extend Maryland's
common-law voluntariness doctrine to
statements made to private individuals.
Id. In the alternative, Pappas argued
that the voluntariness doctrine's
requirement that the statement be

made to a "person in authority"
should include statements made to
employers. Id. at 172, 721 A.2d at
243. The State, on the other hand,
argued that admissibility depended
solely upon the reliability of the
statement. Id. at 172, 721 A.2d at
244.
To be admissible, the court
stated, a confession must be "(1)
voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law, (2) voluntary under
the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ofthe United
States Constitution and Article 22 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
and (3) elicited in conformance with
the mandates of Miranda." Id.
(quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156,
173-74, 699 A.2d 1170, 1178
(1997». The court determined that
the constitutional requirements of
federal due process and Miranda
warnings do not apply to private
actions. Id. at 173,721 A.2d at 244.
Thus,
the
issue
in
Pappaconstantinou turned on
whether Pappas's confession was
admissible under Maryland law. Id.
at 172-73, 721 A.2d at 244.
In reaching its conclusion, the
court reviewed Maryland case law,
which, in summary, required
incriminating statements to be
excluded from evidence when made
directly to an "officer or sheriff, or in
the presence and with at least the
implicit sanction oflegal authority."
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Id. at 178, 721 A.2d at 246. The
seminal case in Maryland, Nicholson
v. State, held that a confession is
inadmissible ifit is induced by a police
officer's threat or promise of
advantage. Id. at 174, 721 A.2d at
245 (citing Nicholson v. State, 38
Md. 140, 153 (1873».
The court noted only two cases
upon which Pappas could rely to
support his position. Id. at 178, 721
A. 2d at 247. The first, Watts v. State,
held that a confession made to a
reporter in the presence ofthe deputy
sheriff and warden was inadmissible
for lack of voluntariness. Id at 17879,721 A. 2d at 247 (citing Wattsv.
State 99 Md. 30,35,57 A. 542, 544
(1904». In the second case, Scott
v. State, the defendant alleged that he
was threatened by his father in the
presence of the police. Id. at 179,
721 A.2dat247 (citingScottv. State,
61 Md. App. 599, 602, 487 A.2d
1204, 1205 (1985». The court in
Scott stated in dicta that the lack of
an agency relationship does not
"preclude a finding that the confession
was involuntary." Id. (quoting Scott
at 604,487 A.2d at 1206».
The
court,
however,
distinguished Watts and Scott because
both involved confessions obtained in
the presence of the police and
"[n]either case stands for the
proposition that a confession elicited
by purely private conduct is subject
to Maryland's common-law
voluntariness requirement." Id. at
180, 721 A.2d at 247. Thus, in order
for a confession to be rendered
involuntary, the confession must be
given in the presence of at least one
person having legal authority over the

accused. Id. As such, the court
concluded that Maryland's commonlaw requirement ofvoluntariness does
not apply when a private individual,
acting without police intervention,
elicits a confession, as was the case
here. Id. at 180, 721 A.2d at 248.
Next, the court rejected
Pappas's alternative argument that
"persons in authority" should not be
limited to state actors and should
include persons, such as employers,
who "have real authority over the
accused and the power to carry out a
threat or promise." Id. The court
stated that the requirement of
voluntariness protects citizens from
"overreaching" police. Id. at 18081, 721 A.2d at 248. Consequently,
excluding confessions obtained by
private persons does nothing to further
the goal of deterring overreaching
police conduct. Id.
Rejecting both of Pappas's
voluntariness arguments, the court
stated that whether a statement made
to a private actor is admissible
depends on whether it is trustworthy,
competent, and accurate. Id. at 181,
721 A.2d at 248 (citing Jacobs v.
State, 45 Md. App. 634, 646,415
A.2d 590, 597 (1980». The court
held that the issue oftrustworthiness
was to be reviewed under the
Maryland Rules of Evidence, which
pennits the admissibility ofall relevant
evidence. !d. (citing MD. R. EVID.
5-402). Relevant evidence, the court
stated, is evidence which makes the
existence of a fact "more probable or
less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Id. (citing MD. R.
EVID. 5-401). The court noted,
however, that Maryland law allows for

the exclusion of relevant evidence
where there is a danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion, or delay. Id.
(citing Mo. R. EVID. 5-601).
The trial court, the court stated,
determines whether evidence is
relevant and admissible. Id. at 182,
721 A.2d at 248 (citing McCleary v.
State, 122 Md. 394, 408, 89 A.
1100,1106 (1914». Oncethetrial
judge determines admissibility, the jury
may hear the evidence and give it
"whatever weight it chooses" and
decide whether threats or promises
were present which would have
rendered the defendant's confession
involuntary. Id. at 182,721 A.2dat
249. Finding that the trial court did
not err in determining that Pappas's
written statement was "sufficiently
reliable" to be admitted into evidence
at trial, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court. Id. at 183, 721 A.2d
at 249.
Following the decision in this
case, the voluntariness requirement is
not extended to apply to statements
made to private actors. This holding
may result in private actors taking the
law into their own hands by coercing
confessions and handing them over to
the police. In other words, private
actors may, in effect, perform a law
enforcement function having a
coercive, overreaching effect - the
kind of effect the voluntariness
requirement attempts to alleviate.
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